Tamil Nadu v. Governor: Governor’s Pocket Veto Powers under Articles 200–201
The case of Tamil Nadu v. Governor is a landmark decision clarifying the scope of the Governor’s pocket veto powers under Articles 200 and 201 of the Indian Constitution. These provisions deal with assent to bills passed by the State Legislature and the options available to the Governor, including granting assent, withholding assent, reserving the bill for the President, or taking no action (pocket veto). The judgment underscores the constitutional boundaries, discretion, and limits of the Governor’s role in the legislative process.
Under Article 200, when a bill is presented to the Governor after passage in the State Legislative Assembly, the Governor has four options:
- Give assent to the bill.
- Withhold assent.
- Reserve the bill for the President’s consideration.
- Return the bill, if it is not a money bill, with recommendations for reconsideration.
The Governor’s discretion is meant to safeguard constitutional compliance and public interest, especially in cases where a bill may violate fundamental rights, contravene federal principles, or conflict with Union legislation. However, the question arises whether the Governor can abstain indefinitely from acting on a bill, effectively exercising a pocket veto.
In Tamil Nadu v. Governor, the State Government challenged the Governor’s inaction in not returning or reserving certain bills, arguing that such prolonged delay amounted to constitutional overreach and undermined the legislative process. The Court examined the text of Articles 200 and 201, legislative intent, and historical practices to determine whether a Governor’s silence could legally prevent a bill from becoming law.
The Supreme Court clarified that while the Governor has discretion under Articles 200 and 201, this discretion is not absolute or arbitrary. The Court held that:
- Pocket veto is constitutionally permissible, allowing the Governor to withhold action temporarily, especially when seeking further clarification or considering constitutional validity issues.
- Indefinite inaction without reason violates constitutional principles, as it frustrates the legislature’s mandate and democratic process.
- The Governor must act within a reasonable time and cannot use the pocket veto as a tool to permanently block legislation.
The Court emphasized the fiduciary nature of the Governor’s powers. As a constitutional authority, the Governor must act in accordance with the Constitution, advice of the Council of Ministers (Article 163), and principles of federalism, without usurping the legislative function. While reserving a bill for the President or returning it is a legitimate safeguard, inaction should not override the legislature’s intent or the democratic mandate of the elected government.
The judgment also noted the distinction between money bills and ordinary bills. For money bills, under Article 201, the Governor cannot return the bill and must act by either giving assent or reserving it for the President, limiting discretion. In ordinary bills, however, return with recommendations or reservation for Presidential assent is permissible, and pocket veto can be used temporarily but not indefinitely.
In conclusion, the Tamil Nadu v. Governor case establishes that the Governor’s pocket veto under Articles 200–201 is a constitutional tool to exercise discretion, but it is bounded by reasonableness, accountability, and respect for the legislature’s mandate. While temporary withholding of assent is permissible, indefinite inaction is unconstitutional, ensuring that the Governor’s role remains a check without obstructing democracy. The case underscores the delicate balance between legislative authority and gubernatorial discretion in India’s federal and parliamentary system.